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California has long been in the vanguard of
national trends. Since mid-2000, California has ex-
perienced a considerable number of problems with
its electricity market, including fluctuating prices
and shortages. California’s electricity woes give us
reason to pause and consider the future of U.S.
electricity markets and of energy policies in general.
Electricity is an important part of the U.S.
energy infrastructure, accounting for more than
one-third of U.S. energy consumption. If other
states experienced problems with their electricity
markets similar to those in California, the effects
would be felt throughout the economy.
Nearly half the states are restructuring their
electricity markets, and many more are consider-
ing doing so. As Chart 1 shows, eight states have
already implemented restructuring of their elec-
tricity markets. Sixteen states and the District of
Columbia have enacted legislation or issued regula-
tory orders that will restructure their electricity
markets, while 18 states are investigating the possi-
bility of restructuring. Only eight states are not cur-
rently taking any steps toward electricity market
restructuring.
A proposal that would open real estate brokerage and management to
banking organizations has generated a maelstrom of controversy, as evi-
denced by more than 44,000 comment letters and e-mails that have deluged
the Federal Reserve Board.
The major banking industry trade groups have joined forces as propo-
nents of the proposal, squaring off against the National Association of Realtors,
which spearheaded a write-in campaign opposing it. The realtors’ arguments
caught the attention of Congress, which prevailed upon the Fed to extend 
its deadline for submission of comments to May 1, 2001, and prompted 
the House Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit Subcommittee to hold
hearings on the proposed regulation.
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(Continued on page 9)The problems with the California
electricity market are the result of several
factors, including a poorly devised
restructuring that took place nearly three
years ago. As the states progress toward
restructuring their electricity markets, we
should ask: Are California’s electricity
woes a dark vision of the future or an
isolated incident in a state where policy-
making was not sufficiently informed by
economic reality?
What Is Restructuring?
It is convenient to think of the elec-
tricity industry as made up of four func-
tions:
• Electricity generation – The simple
production of electricity. 
• Transmission  – The movement of
electricity over high-voltage lines
from the generators to power sub-
stations in cities, towns and rural
areas throughout the country. 
• Distribution  – The movement of
electricity over lower-voltage lines
from power substations to cus-
tomers. 
• Marketing – The sale of electricity to
customers.
Currently, most regions of the country
are served by integrated electric utilities,
each of which performs all four of the
functions, from generating electric power
to selling it. These utilities established
natural monopolies in transmission and
distribution, which were extended into
generation and marketing. (Transmission
and distribution are considered natural
monopolies because a single provider is
thought to be the most efficient means of
production.) A utility’s electric rates are
subject to regulation at the state level; in
the typical process, rates are set to earn
what the regulators deem to be a fair rate
of return on the investment.
Restructuring consists of opening one
or more segments of the current system
to competition. A number of variations
are possible across the 50 states and the
District of Columbia. As typically envi-
sioned by policy analysts, however,
restructuring has five fundamental ele-
ments (in which some regulation is
retained):
• Electricity generation is opened to
competition with free entry of new
power plants and private contracts. 
• Transmission and distribution remain
in the hands of the utilities and under
regulatory control because they are
viewed as natural monopolies. 
• Marketing to consumers is opened
to competition. 
• Electricity prices are free to move. 
• A range of market instruments,
including long-term contracts, spot
sales and market-making activities, is
allowed and encouraged.
A mixture of market instruments for
conducting electricity sales is important
in creating well-functioning markets.
Long-term contracts distribute the risks
between buyers and sellers and enable
planning. Spot sales allow a response 
to changing market conditions. Market-
making is an activity of firms, such as
Enron Corp. in Houston, that act as inter-
mediaries in the electricity market. They
buy electricity under contracts of a given
duration and sell it under contracts of
another duration. This intermediation helps
make electricity markets more efficient
and restructuring more successful.
California’s Restructuring 
Not Prototypical
The restructuring of California’s elec-
tricity markets provided for much less
deregulation than is prototypical.
• California opened its generation
markets to competition but did not
permit the free entry of new power
plants. 
• It retained regulation of transmission
and distribution, as is prototypical,
but a public agency assumed control
of some transmission lines. 
• It did not open up marketing and
sales to competition. 
• It froze retail electricity prices. 
• It banned the use of long-term mar-
ket instruments and forced all power
to be transacted through a daily spot
market operated by a public agency.
In doing so, California totally dis-
couraged market-making activities. 
In short, California has not created a
transition to a free electricity market, and
its restructuring should not be consid-
ered deregulation.
Growth and Seasonality in
California Electricity Demand
California’s electricity consumption
has been growing for years. In 2000, it
surged a surprising 8 percent (Chart 2).
California’s electricity demand is met by
three forms of supply: baseload, imports
and peaking. The baseload supply costs
the least and is typically produced in
coal-fired, nuclear, hydroelectric and some
oil-fired power plants that operate nearly
continuously. Imports from baseload facili-
ties in other states generally have inter-
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Many States Restructuring Electricity Markets
Chart 1
SOURCES: Author; Department of Energy.
Already restructured Ready to restructure Investigating restructuring No restructuring plansmediate costs because of the added
transportation costs. Peak supplies cost
the most and are typically produced in
oil- and natural gas-fired power plants
that operate intermittently to meet peak
demands.
As its electricity consumption grew,
California became more reliant on costly
sources of electricity because it had not
developed additional baseload capacity.
The expense of operating peaking facili-
ties rose substantially with oil and nat-
ural gas prices.
Seasonality is an important aspect of
California’s electricity woes. As shown in
Chart 3, the demand for electricity varies
by season, with demand strongest in
summer and second strongest in winter.
When demand is weak in spring and fall,
lower-cost baseload facilities can provide
all or most of the electricity. As demand
strengthens seasonally, electricity pro-
duced in higher-cost peaking facilities is
drawn from other states.
As the California economy grew, its
energy demand also grew, but the ability
to produce electricity in less expensive
baseload plants did not expand. The
development of new electricity genera-
tion facilities was checked for environ-
mental reasons. Californians did not
want the pollution associated with the
additional electric power plants. In addi-
tion, electric utilities, fearing they would
be unable to recover their costs as the
state moved away from rate-based regu-
lation, stopped trying to build new gen-
eration facilities. The imposition of price
caps on retail electricity prices under the
state’s restructuring plan further deterred
the development of new power plants.
1
Without additions to baseload capac-
ity or additional imports, an increase in
demand increases the reliance on higher-
cost peaking facilities and could result 
in a shortage during periods of extreme
demand, such as might occur in summer.
An increase in the strength of seasonality
accentuates the problem. Moderate re-
ductions in baseload supply and imports
further increase reliance on peaking
facilities and expose the state to more
power-shortage episodes.
But many Californians seem surprised
to be paying the higher electric rates that
resulted from the policies that made
electricity scarce. They fail to make the
connection between opposition to new
power plants and increased reliance on
higher-cost sources of electricity.
An Economics 101 Perspective
Most aspects of California’s electric-
ity problems can be illustrated with a
supply and demand diagram (Chart 4).
First consider the market before restruc-
turing. California’s electricity supply comes
from lower-cost baseload plants, inter-
mediate-cost imports and higher-cost
peaking facilities. Higher prices support
production at more facilities, and, there-
fore, more electricity is available at higher
prices along the supply curve (S1). A
demand curve (D1) shows consumers
willing to purchase more electricity at
lower prices. Together, supply and
demand establish a market-clearing price
and quantity (at Pa and Qa, respectively).
When California opened its elec-
tricity generation market to competition,
policymakers hoped competition between
power plant owners would shift the 
supply curve outward, but they also
imposed a price ceiling (at Pc) to main-
tain stable retail prices.
Rising energy prices and the
reduced availability of baseload capacity
and imports curtailed electricity supply
in California (to S2).
2 Costs rose most at
peaking plants that rely on natural gas.
At the same time, strong economic
growth boosted electricity demand (to
D2). These changes should have estab-
lished a new market-clearing price and
quantity (at Pb and Qb, respectively).
As shown in the chart, however, the
market-clearing price was higher than
the price ceiling and could not be
charged to the consumers. With the price
ceiling in place (at Pc), consumers tried
to purchase much more electricity (Qd)
than producers were willing to sell (Qc)
at the ceiling price. 
If we stopped here, we would have
a classic shortage at the price ceiling. But
electric utilities have a duty to serve
under the law. Consequently, California’s
utilities were legally obligated to supply
all the electricity consumers wanted to
purchase (Qd) at the ceiling price. To do
so, utilities were forced to pay a much
higher price (Pd) for electricity on the
open market. Because the utilities did
not quite succeed in obtaining all the
electricity customers wanted at the ceil-
ing price, the result was a combination
of shortages and utilities paying higher
prices for electricity than they could sell
it for to their own customers.
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ceilingBy the end of 2000, California utilities
were paying a wholesale spot price of
about 40 cents per kilowatt-hour, but they
were only allowed to sell it to their cus-
tomers for about 10 cents per kilowatt-
hour (Chart 5 ). California’s failure to
allow retail prices to rise to reflect market
conditions has had several effects. The
most obvious is that it put a financial
burden on the utilities, which led to the
bankruptcy filing of one of the two major
California utilities. In addition, low prices
discourage the development of additional
supply while encouraging customers to
continue low-valued uses of electricity.
Economic Effects 
Are Relatively Small
Although we have heard stories
about how the electricity blackouts are
affecting industry, the disruptions of
electric service appear to have had only
a mild aggregate effect on the California
economy. A few analysts have specu-
lated that sustained service disruptions
that are no worse than those already
experienced would reduce California’s
gross state product by about 0.2 percent
below what it would otherwise be. Tak-
ing into account California’s size and the
negative ripple effects to other states, we
might guess that the total impact on the
national economy would be to reduce
GDP by about 0.1 percent—though
some analysts suggest the spillovers to
the national economy would be smaller.
If California does not resolve its
electricity problems, however, the longer-
term effects on the state may be signifi-
cant. Unreliable electricity service could
make California less attractive to busi-
ness and slow the state’s economic
growth. Some of that growth could be
displaced to other states.
Successful Electricity Market
Restructuring
To develop standards for evaluating
the restructuring of electricity markets,
we can draw upon what appears to be a
successful experience in the United King-
dom as well as fundamental strategies
suggested by analysts. We can use these
standards to evaluate and suggest changes
in the electricity market restructuring in
California, Texas and other states.
Successful restructuring of electricity
markets includes several key elements:
• Ensuring sufficient generation capac-
ity (and fuel supplies).
• Opening power generation to com-
petition with the free entry of new
power plants and private contracts.
• Opening marketing and sales to
competition.
• Freeing electricity prices to move
with changes in market conditions.
• Allowing a range of market instru-
ments, including long-term contracts
and spot sales.
• Encouraging private market-making
activity.
Success should not be judged by the
often-used political barometer of stable
prices, but rather by the extent to which
the market is allowed to operate freely
with minimum disruption. With energy
prices rising and environmental restraints
curtailing electricity production, higher
prices will help allocate scarce electricity




California has room for improvement
in most areas. California entered deregu-
lation with insufficient capacity. The state
has deregulated its power generation
market, but it must also reduce its regu-
latory impediments to power plant de-
velopment. It is taking some steps in that
direction. California should also allow
the development of additional natural
gas pipelines to enhance natural gas de-
liverability to power plants using that fuel.
California could accomplish much
by opening marketing and sales to com-
petition. It also should allow electricity
prices to move freely with market condi-
tions. Freely moving prices would en-
courage consumers to conserve electric-
ity and, at the same time, stimulate the
construction of new power plants.
California has begun seeking elec-
tricity supply under long-term contracts,
but it has interjected the state and its
nonprofit electricity system operator into
the process. California needs to allow a
range of market instruments, including
long-term contracts and spot sales, as
well as private market-making activities.
In the short run, these solutions are
likely to raise electricity prices in Califor-
nia, which would reflect the state’s
scarcity of electricity. But the philosophy
of market-determined prices would
encourage the building of new power
plants, while higher prices would dis-
courage consumption. In the long run,
prices would fall, but probably not as
low as they were prior to restructuring—
unless overall energy prices also fall.
Electricity Market 
Restructuring in Texas
Texas is in the process of restructur-
ing electricity markets in most areas of
the state. Restructuring will be com-
pletely phased in by the end of 2001. As
Texas approaches its restructuring, suc-
cess seems very likely.
Texas is entering deregulation with
sufficient generation capacity and fuel
supplies. It is opening electricity genera-
tion to competition with the free entry of
new power plants and private contracts.
Marketing and sales to consumers will
be opened to competition. Electricity
prices will be free to move. Texas is
allowing a range of market instruments
such as long-term contracts and spot
sales and encouraging private market-
making activities.
One potential problem with Texas’
electricity market restructuring is a regu-
latory order that may leave utilities in 
the position of acting as providers of 
last resort. Providers of last resort pro-
vide electricity service at regulated rates
to those who do not choose or are left
without competitive suppliers. Providers
of last resort could take losses if they
were required to supply electricity at lower
rates than prevail on the free market.
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2000 1999 1998Only Oregon seems to be freeing its
electricity markets as little as California.
Oregon imports significant quantities of
electricity, is not allowing for entry into
marketing and sales, is retaining regu-
lated prices and is discouraging market-
making activities. The other 26 states do
not currently have concrete plans for re-
structuring and are in a position to learn
from those that are preceding them.
A Wake-Up Call?
In some sense, California’s electricity
woes should serve as a wake-up call for
thinking about the direction of U.S. elec-
tricity markets and energy policy. The
Department of Energy forecasts that U.S.
electricity consumption will grow by more
than 30 percent over the next two dec-
ades, while the use of natural gas to pro-
duce electricity will increase by nearly 60
percent (Chart 7 ). That forecast calls for
a much stronger growth rate in the use
of natural gas for electricity generation
than occurred over the past 30 years.
The infrastructure to produce the
additional electricity and supply the
additional natural gas does not currently
exist. If people in other states take the
same attitude toward the development of
new electric power facilities and natural
gas pipelines as Californians have taken
over the past 20 years, electricity will be
relatively scarce, and either higher prices
or electricity shortages will result.
In a broader sense, we face the same
issues in thinking about future economic
growth and the resulting growth in
energy demand. As shown in Chart 8,
the Department of Energy forecasts that
U.S. energy consumption will grow by
more than 40 percent (about 1.8 percent
annually) over the next 20 years, while
real GDP grows by 3 percent annually.
Restricting the growth of energy
consumption to pursue other goals—
such as a cleaner environment—will re-
Electricity Market 
Restructuring in Other States
Most states progressing toward elec-
tricity market restructuring are creating
freer markets than California did. Of the
24 states and the District of Columbia
that have deregulated or taken concrete
steps toward deregulation, eight seem to
meet the criteria for a successful transi-
tion to a free market—though Pennsyl-
vania and Texas are requiring utilities to
act as providers of last resort (Chart 6 ).
In Pennsylvania, some of the major utili-
ties have had some difficulty securing
supply to fulfill their role as providers of
last resort.
Eleven states are entering deregula-
tion in pretty good shape. Nine of these
states have price caps but sufficient in-
state generating capacity. Connecticut
and Virginia do not have price caps but
do import significant quantities of elec-
tricity. Arizona and Virginia have pro-
viders of last resort.
Three states and the District of
Columbia are in only slightly better shape
than California. They import significant
quantities of electricity. In addition,
Maryland, Delaware and the District of
Columbia have price caps, and New
York has other impediments to freely
functioning electricity markets.
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Most States Creating Freer Markets Than California
Chart 6
SOURCES: Author; Department of Energy.
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Coalduce economic growth. This is not to say
that we should not pursue a clean en-
vironment. Rather it is to acknowledge
that a clean environment has a cost.
Some analysts have promoted the notion
that a clean environment can be had
without cost. That view helped shape
the policies that created California’s elec-
tricity crisis.
Learning from California
The effective restructuring of an
electricity market creates a transition to a
free market, but California’s restructuring
plan was far from yielding a free elec-
tricity market. California’s course correc-
tions to date do not represent much
more of a transition to a free market.
Most of the states moving toward elec-
tricity market restructuring are going
much farther toward creating free mar-
kets for electricity than California has,
but only eight seem to be making a com-
plete transition to free markets.
If they do not worsen, California’s
electricity woes should have a small but
noticeable effect on economic growth.
Nonetheless, California’s electricity prob-
lems remind us that economic growth is
facilitated by abundant energy supplies.
Limiting energy consumption in the pur-
suit of other goals—such as a cleaner
environment—has a cost. In making pol-
icy, we should explicitly consider these
costs rather than pretend they do not
exist. The resulting policy will have a
much sounder basis in economic reality
than in wishful thinking. And California’s
woes will be a wake-up call rather than
a vision of the future.
—Stephen Brown
Brown is director of energy economics at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Notes
Thanks to Charis Ward for outstanding research assistance.
1 Grobman and Carey (2001) show that electricity price caps can deter
the development of new generation facilities and result in higher aver-
age consumer prices for electricity.
2 Joskow and Kahn (2001) find evidence that prices were above mar-
ginal cost and power-generating companies withheld production from
some of their higher-cost facilities during periods of California’s peak
demand during the summer months of 2000. Joskow and Kahn tenta-
tively interpret their findings as evidence of the exercise of monopoly
power, and some recent settlements may provide confirming evidence.
Nonetheless, their findings also could be the result of a rational
response to the probability that the California utilities purchasing the
electricity were having financial problems and might default. Given the
probability of default, electricity producers might require higher prices
as compensation for the risk and not use facilities where the price does
not compensate for production costs plus the additional risk.
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in the pursuit of other
goals—such as a
cleaner environment
—has a cost.One problem with the California
electricity market is that peak demand
far exceeds availability. The negative
consequences of the demand–supply
imbalance have raised a question about
the reliability of electricity supply in
other areas of the country. Analysts and
consumers alike are now asking if 
there will be sufficient electricity to meet
the anticipated demand over the next
few years.
When thinking about the reliability
of supply, two issues come to mind. The
most obvious is the question of genera-
tion capacity. Are there enough power
plants to meet demand? Second, and
often overlooked, is the structure of the
transmission network. Will the current
system be able to move the expected
increased amounts of electricity from
power plants to consumers? Both of
these elements determine the reliability
of supply in a region. 
According to the North American
Electric Reliability Council (NERC), the
reliability of supply is acceptable in most
U.S. regions; problems are currently
localized to the Western states and New
York. However, continuous monitoring,
planned additions to generation and trans-
mission systems, and sensible restructur-
ing schemes are vital to ensuring relia-
bility of supply as more states progress
in restructuring their electricity markets.
NERC was formed in 1968 as a not-
for-profit organization to promote the
reliability of electricity supply for all of
North America. Its members consist of 10
regional councils, which oversee reliabil-
ity issues for the member states within
their region (Chart 1). What follows is a
brief outlook for each of these regions
based on NERC’s most recent reliability
assessment.
1
East Control Area Reliability (ECAR)
ECAR is currently meeting its electric-
ity demand obligations. However, by 2009
over 66 percent of its generating facilities
will be 30 years old or older, thus in-
creasing maintenance and lengthening
outage durations. In addition, overloads
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North American Electric Reliability Council Regions
Chart 1















A Brief Look at U.S. Prospects
Analysts and
consumers alike are





next few years.near the MAPP area raises some concern.
Overall, outages are not anticipated for
this summer.
Mid-Continent Area Power Pool
(U.S.) (MAPP)
Member states should be slightly con-
cerned about reliability of supply. While
over 500 miles of additional transmission
is planned over the next 10 years, gen-
eration capacity deficits remain a possi-
bility. To decrease dependence on Cana-
dian supply and guard against capacity
deficits, utilities in the region are propos-




New York residents have reason to
worry. Generating capacity could be
below NPCC standards as early as 2003,
and the occurrence of blackouts and
brownouts this summer is possible. Nearly
all other states in the NPCC region appear
to have additional generation capacity
planned to accommodate future demand.
Southeastern Electric 
Reliability Council (SERC)
Existing and planned resources are
deemed adequate in lieu of low reserve
margins because of the region’s commit-
ment to using short lead-time resources
to add significant new capacity. SERC
members have done a good job of 
continuing to plan for a reliable bulk
transmission system, with 2,097 miles of
additional lines projected for completion
by 2009.
Southwest Power Pool (SPP)
The SPP region has room for
improvement. Capacity margins are
expected to decline through 2003, and
few transmission system additions are
planned. Rates are expected to rise, but
the possibility of brownouts or blackouts
remains low this summer. 
Western Systems Coordinating
Council (WSCC)
The WSCC includes four subregions
covering the Western United States.
Northwest Power Pool Area (NWPP).
Extremely high peak demand combined
with severe weather could impose serious
constraints on the power system. Areas
within the region are experiencing low
water levels, which could lead to less
than normal electricity generation from
hydroelectric power plants and a short-
fall in total supply. Oregon, Washington
and far northern California could see fur-
ther rate increases this summer and have
a good chance of brownouts, blackouts
or both. The remaining states appear to
be in only fair condition.
Arizona–New Mexico–Southern Ne-
vada Power Area (AZNMSNV). Over the
next 10 years, peak demand is expected
to grow at a 3.6 percent rate, com-
pounded annually. Although few projects
are planned to improve the reliability
and capability of transmission systems,
capacity margins appear healthy and
range from 11.3 to 28.1 percent. Summer
brownouts and blackouts are not ex-
pected.
Rocky Mountain Power Area (RMPA).
Peak demand is estimated to increase at
a compound annual rate of 2.7 percent
for the next 10 years, with resource
capacity margins projected to remain
between 15.8 and 24.4 percent. The
region as a whole has proposed signifi-
cant additions to its transmission system,
which will have a large positive impact
on the region’s transfer capabilities.
California–Mexico Area (U.S.) (CA–
MX). Through 2009, resource capacity
margins are expected to be between 9.3
and 17.8 percent. The restructuring of
the electricity industry in this region has
made it difficult to accurately project
future generating capacities. Present
power supplies are extremely tight and
the transmission system heavily bur-
dened. Further brownouts and blackouts
remain a threat, along with upward
movement in residential rates.
—Charis L. Ward
Ward is an economic analyst in the
Research Department at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas.
Notes
Thanks to Steve Brown and Kay Champagne for helpful comments and
suggestions.
1 North American Electric Reliability Council, Reliability Assessment
2000–2009: The Reliability of Bulk Electric Systems in North Amer-
ica, October 2000, pp. 49–75.
2 Florida Public Service Commission, “Review of Electric Utility 2000
Ten-Year Site Plans,” December 2000, p. 9.
on the transmission system are deemed
possible in the near future. To alleviate
this problem, 456 miles of additional
extra-high-voltage transmission lines has
been proposed and could be operational
in 2005.
Electric Reliability Council 
of Texas (ERCOT)
The Lone Star State appears to be
adequately prepared for deregulation,
assuming that enough time has been
allowed for proper resource development
to ensure adequate generation and trans-
mission capabilities. Existing transmis-
sion systems are strained in periods of
peak demand; however, ERCOT has ap-
proved the construction of new trans-
mission lines to help alleviate constraints,




Current and proposed additions to
generation capacity and transmission
system capability should provide suffi-
cient electricity reserves in the future.
One concern, however, is that Florida
may not have sufficient natural gas sup-
plies to generate electricity. Florida relies
on only a single gas transmission pipe-
line company, Florida Gas Transmission
Co., and future demand will exceed ca-
pacity. The Florida Public Service Com-
mission estimates an additional 1 billion
cubic feet per day may be needed over
the next 10 years to generate enough
electricity to meet the forecasted demand.
2
Mid-Atlantic Area Council (MAAC)
Overall, this region appears to have
sufficient generation capacity to sustain
forecasted energy growth rates through
2005. However, concerns have been
raised in some states over whether trans-
mission systems will be able to deliver
the increased loads. Various states within
MAAC do have a small chance of experi-
encing outages this summer.
Mid-America Interconnected
Network (MAIN)
The MAIN region imports a sub-
stantial amount of electricity from the
adjacent ECAR and MAPP regions. While
current import capabilities appear ade-
quate, congestion on transmission lines
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Federal Reserve Board and the Treasury
the authority to define new activities that
are financial in nature or incidental to
financial activities. Nonfinancial activi-
ties determined to be “complementary”
to financial activities are also permitted.
These standards represent a significant
expansion from the previous require-
ment that bank holding company activi-
ties must be “closely related to banking.”
By delegating to the regulatory agen-
cies the responsibility to resolve certain
issues, Congress recognized the need to
keep financial regulation responsive to
The controversy extends beyond the
mere self-interest of competing business
groups to include the core issues of
enhancing the competitive marketplace
and protecting the safety and soundness
of the financial system. Indeed, Federal
Reserve Board Governor Edward W. Kel-
ley Jr. expressed some concern at the
outset that as banking organizations
engage in more activities related to real
estate, it could become more difficult in
the future to rule them out as real estate
investors and developers.
His reservations echoed a long-
running debate. For many years, consid-
eration of expanded bank participa-
tion in real estate activities, including a
1987 proposal that would have allowed
limited real estate investment activities,
has been stymied by concerns that it
may pose unacceptable risks for banks
and lead to a highly concentrated and,
therefore, less competitive industry.
The latest proposal is once again
testing the changing divide between
banking and commerce. Given the exist-
ing regulatory safeguards, along with the
market forces and technological applica-
tions that are reshaping the financial ser-
vices industry, the big winner—if the
proposal were adopted—stands to be
the consumer.
Laying the Groundwork
Specifically, the current proposal put
forth jointly by the Federal Reserve Board
and the Treasury Department seeks 
public comment on whether real estate
brokerage and real estate management
should be determined as activities that
are financial in nature or incidental to a
financial activity and, therefore, permis-
sible for financial holding companies
and financial subsidiaries of national
banks. (See box titled “Real Estate Bro-
kerage and Management Activities De-
fined.”) The proposal would not allow
financial holding companies to engage in
real estate investment or development.
The legislation underlying the pro-
posal is the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act,
which, in 1999, authorized a platform
upon which the next generation of
financial institutions would be built. At
its foundation was the existing finan-
cial system, whose structure had been
shaped by years of incremental deregu-
lation brought about by market develop-
ments and technological advancements.
(See box titled “A Brief History of Bank
Regulation.”)
Some sections of the historic act
were drafted in fine detail. The legisla-
tion contains, for example, an explicit list
of financial activities in which financial
holding companies may engage, includ-
ing insurance and securities underwrit-
ing and agency activities, merchant
banking and insurance company port-
folio investment activities. It also allows
national banks to engage in a broad
range of new financial activities through
financial subsidiaries, with certain excep-
tions. Banking organizations have already
made substantial inroads into nontradi-
tional activities. As seen in Chart 1, the
largest banking organizations have nearly
tripled their involvement in nonbanking
activities in the last five years.
Other sections of the act were, by
design, sketched broadly enough to
leave room for future interpretation by
the regulatory agencies. While the out-
right mixing of banking and commerce
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Banks as Real Estate Brokers
(Continued from front page) Assets in Nonbank
Subsidiaries of Bank Holding
Companies
Percent of organization assets
Chart 1
















Real Estate Brokerage and Management Activities Defined
Real estate brokerage:
  is the business of bringing together parties involved in a real estate transaction (purchase, sale,
exchange, lease or rental) and negotiating a contract.
  includes acting as agent; listing and advertising; locating buyers, sellers, lessors and lessees; 
conveying information; providing advice; negotiating price; and administering the closing.
  does not involve purchasing or selling real estate as principal and may only be conducted pursuant 
to state licensing laws and regulations.
Real estate management:
  is the business of providing for others daily management of real estate. This can include procuring
tenants; negotiating leases; maintaining security deposits; billing and collecting rents; accounting;
making principal, interest, insurance, tax and utilities payments; and overseeing inspection, mainte-
nance and upkeep of real property.  
  does not involve purchasing, selling or owning real estate as principal.  
  is subject to the same state licensing laws and regulations that apply to real estate brokers.the changing environment and acknowl-
edged the agencies’ technical expertise
in this area.
The repeal of the outdated restric-
tions on commercial bank activities and
affiliations with securities and insurance
firms was expected to accelerate the
integration of financial conglomerates.
Before Gramm–Leach–Bliley, only a few
banking organizations were able to de-
velop into diversified financial services
providers by working their way through
a maze of regulatory loopholes. As the
act’s reach is tested by proposals such as
this one, the concept of full-service
financial institutions will move closer to
becoming a reality.
Do the Proposed Activities 
Fit within Gramm–Leach–Bliley?
Supporters of the proposal contend
that real estate is financial in nature and
that real estate brokerage falls into the
statutorily listed financial activity of lend-
ing, exchanging, transferring, investing
for others or safeguarding financial
assets other than money or securities.
This group also argues that the purchase,
sale or lease of real estate is a financial
transaction and, thus, brokerage should
be categorized under the permitted
activities of arranging, effecting or facili-
tating financial transactions for third-
party accounts. A home purchase could
be considered financial in nature since a
house is many people’s largest asset, real
estate supports a significant amount of
mortgage-backed securities and real
estate investment serves as a means of
wealth creation.
Opponents argue that these attributes
could apply to other assets that are 
not generally thought of as financial in
nature. For example, automobiles are
also a major asset for many people, and
collectibles may be used to build wealth;
but that may not make the purchase of a
sedan or an antique desk financial in
nature or incidental to a financial activ-
ity. Therefore, opponents feel that these
attributes are insufficient to make an
asset financial in nature.
In any case, there are a number of
other reasons one might consider real
estate brokerage and management to be
financial in nature or incidental to a
financial activity. First, bank holding
companies and their subsidiaries are 
routinely involved with various real
estate-related activities and most aspects,
other than brokerage, of the typical real
estate transaction. Bank trust depart-
ments, for example, work with real estate
assets belonging to trust estates. Second,
thrifts and some state banks already pro-
vide these very services, with approval
from their primary regulators. Third, some
aspects of real estate brokerage are simi-
lar to permissible finder activities in which
national banks and financial holding
companies work to match buyers and
sellers.
Perhaps the most cogent argument is
that real estate brokerage may have be-
come a necessary activity for banks to
compete effectively with other compa-
nies that provide bundled financial 
services.
1 Gramm–Leach–Bliley expands
significantly the agencies’ capacity to
consider the competitive realities of the
financial marketplace in determining an
activity’s permissibility. Critical issues in-
clude changes in the marketplace and
new technology. The act specifically in-
structs the Federal Reserve Board to de-
termine whether the activity is necessary
or appropriate to allow a financial hold-
ing company to compete effectively with
other financial service companies operat-
ing in the United States. Since other non-
bank providers of mortgage financing
offer real estate brokerage services, it
could be argued that banks are at a 
competitive disadvantage by being pro-
hibited from offering consumers the 





In our free-market economy, business
firms are generally at liberty to decide
for themselves the scope of activities in
which they participate. If the firm offers
consumers an attractive package at the
right cost, it will be rewarded with profit-
ability. For example, a grocery store might
find that expanding its merchandise to
include pharmaceutical goods would in-
crease overall profitability. Conversely, a
bowling alley might decide that a foray
into computer sales would not be a prof-
itable business combination. Successful
expansion into a new activity rests on
synergies between the new activity and
existing ones. These synergies may come








participate.on the production side from shared fixed
costs, for example, or on the demand
side from the convenience of one-stop
shopping.
While banks have not had these
same freedoms, Gramm–Leach–Bliley
provides a way for them to move closer
to becoming full-service financial pro-
viders. If banks can combine products
and services in a way that creates value
for their customers at a reasonable cost,
bank expansion into the new arena will
be profitable. If they cannot provide 
the new services at a price customers 
are willing to pay, the new activity will
be unprofitable and banks will likely
retreat from it. Without regulatory restric-
tions, the market will determine whether
a new activity is a worthwhile venture
for banks.
Entry barriers, such as those im-
posed by the old banking regulations,
reduce competition, thereby allowing
prices to climb higher than what would
otherwise prevail. Hence, should the pro-
posed real estate activities be approved
for banks, the primary beneficiary of the
heightened competition would be the
consumer.
Potential Concerns
By limiting banks to activities that
are  “financial in nature,”  “incidental to
such financial activity” or “complementary
to a financial activity,” Gramm–Leach–
Bliley maintains the long-standing sepa-
ration of banking and commerce. The
costs and benefits of maintaining that
separation are the subject of much dis-
cussion.
3 The real estate proposal raises
the question of whether the potential
concerns about allowing participation in
commercial activities might apply to real
estate brokerage and management.
One such concern is that bank
involvement in real estate brokerage and
management could create conflicts of
interest. A bank might, for example,
potentially tie the provision of credit to
the use of the bank’s real estate broker-
age services. Or a bank might extend
credit to borrowers who are not credit-
worthy to gain commissions or fees on
real estate brokerage or management.
With thousands of bank and non-
bank financial services providers com-
peting for business, the high degree of
competition in the marketplace should
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A Brief History of Bank Regulation
Regulation has long limited the range of activities banks can conduct. At the root of these restric-
tions is the idea that banking and commerce should be separated. Prior to the Civil War, bank charters
commonly prohibited banks from dealing in merchandise; likewise, states prohibited commercial firms
from issuing banknotes.
1
Bank charters continued to limit the scope of banks’ activities in the early 20th century, but deter-
mining exactly what was permissible was not a simple matter. National banks engaged in investment
banking under the assumption that it was a permissible activity, but the Comptroller of the Currency ruled
investment banking to be contrary to the National Bank Act. The national banks circumvented this ruling
by establishing securities affiliates.
The Banking Act of 1933, also known as the Glass–Steagall Act, reestablished the separation of
commercial and investment banking. Fears that bank funds would be used to support weak investment
issues, that commercial banks would be exposed to excessive risk from investment banking, that bank
borrowers would be harmed because of the relationship between banks and the firms they financed, and
that commercial banks might foist weak securities on unsuspecting depositors were seen as justification
for Glass–Steagall restrictions. Kroszner and Rajan (1994) provide evidence to debunk these fears, however.
The product restrictions embodied in Glass–Steagall were just part of the panoply of banking
regulations. Regulation Q limited the interest rates banks could set on deposits. Branching restrictions
under the McFadden Act limited the locations in which a bank could conduct business. Advocates of such
regulations claimed they were necessary to counteract perceived shortcomings of market forces.
2
Product restrictions extend beyond the separation of commercial and investment banking to the
separation of banking and commerce. Some argue that allowing a firm to engage in both banking and
commerce raises concerns over the possible emergence of large, powerful, monopolistic banking–commerce
conglomerates. Such a Darwinian scenario could result in adverse effects on competition, unsafe or un-
sound banking practices, and conflicts of interest. A bank might limit credit to competitors of its commer-
cial operation. A bank might extend credit to its commercial operation, even if lending to the commercial
operation entailed excessive risks. A bank might tie its credit decision to the purchase of products or
services from its commercial operation. A bank might use information gained in its banking operation to
assist its commercial operation. A bank might be exposed to excessive risk from its commercial operation.
Finally, some aspects of the regulatory safety net might be transferred to a bank’s commercial operation.
However, by themselves, these concerns ignore the potential benefits that might result from mixing
banking and commerce. A bank might achieve economies of scope by mixing commercial activities with
its traditional banking activities. A bank might earn additional revenues by cross-selling financial and
commercial services, an opportunity created by the concept of one-stop shopping. A bank might more
effectively diversify its income stream. Commercial firms could bring additional capital to the banking
industry. Finally, allowing a bank to own the firms to which it lends could improve the flow of information
between a bank and its borrowers.
The relative merits of both sides of the issue are still being debated. While banking laws and regula-
tions continue to maintain the separation between banking and commerce, the trend in regulatory policy
has been to increase the range of activities permissible for banks.
Interest rate restrictions were phased out in the 1980s after they had been undermined by techno-
logical and financial innovations. Similarly, geographic restrictions were dismantled incrementally for
decades, culminating in the Riegle–Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994.
Glass–Steagall’s severe restrictions on underwriting and dealing in securities were relaxed piecemeal 
over the years, beginning in the 1980s and culminating in the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act. Restrictions 
on bank participation in insurance, too, were gradually reduced and then broadly liberalized by Gramm–
Leach–Bliley.
This liberalization reflects the extinction of regulations that may have once been appropriate but that
are not adapted to the competitive realities of the modern financial services marketplace. Once cumber-
some regulations limited where a bank could do business and how much it could pay on deposits and
narrowly defined what products it could offer. Today’s more streamlined regulatory environment allows a
heightened role for market forces in banking. Consumers have the freedom to choose to do business with
banks headquartered around the block or across the nation. These banks are free to compete on rates and
terms. A banking office can provide traditional banking services as well as investment and insurance
products.
Under the aegis of Gramm–Leach–Bliley, the scope of products offered at a banking office may
continue to expand and further promote consumer choice and well-being.
Notes
1 Much of the historical analysis here is drawn from Shull (1994).
2 Research shows these fears were unfounded. Kane (1978) finds that competition without Regulation Q did not threaten banks. Jayaratne
and Strahan (1996) find that removal of branching restrictions promotes economic growth.allay any concern about conflicts of
interest. If a bank attempted to tie the
provision of credit to the use of its bro-
kerage services, the consumer could
thwart the bank by turning to one of the
many other mortgage credit providers.
Moreover, antitying statutes already in
place supplement the market-based check
against tying.
4 Competition in the real
estate brokerage business—from both
existing brokers and bank entrants—
would eliminate the incentive banks
might have to risk lending to an un-
creditworthy borrower to earn fees on
the brokerage transaction. Competition
in the mortgage market would cause the
lender to lose money on the loan if it
lowered its lending standards. Compe-
tition in the brokerage market would
prevent the lender from charging high
fees on the brokerage transaction to
recoup that loss.
Another concern is the possibility 
of concentrated market power to the
point of domination. If banks’ entry into
the real estate brokerage and manage-
ment business caused the existing firms
in that industry to fail or to otherwise
exit the industry, the banks could then
use their dominance of the industry to
earn monopoly profits.
Here, too, competitive realities allay
this concern. First, because the real estate
industry is well established, it is unlikely
that banks could drive out all the current
providers of real estate brokerage and
management services. Second, competi-
tion among the banks themselves would
make monopoly profits in the industry
unattainable. Any extraordinary profits a
bank might earn from real estate broker-
age would attract other banks, and the
ensuing competition would drive down
prices. Further, today’s market is highly
competitive, not only because of the
sheer number of firms, but also because
advances in technology and the removal
of geographic branching restrictions
have given banks new opportunities to
do business in remote locations. This
environment has shattered the old para-
digm that the existence of only a few
banks in a market leads to anticompeti-
tive practices. When technology and de-
regulation allow easy entry into all mar-
kets, all markets become competitive.
5
A final concern is that allowing banks
to provide real estate brokerage and
management services may compromise
safety and soundness. If these new busi-
ness lines involved large risks, large losses
in these lines could threaten the financial
soundness of banks themselves.
Because government guarantees on
deposits might weaken the incentive the
market would provide for banks to
maintain safe and sound practices, mar-
ket forces may not completely allay
potential safety and soundness concerns
stemming from bank participation in real
estate brokerage and management. In
addition, the bank safety net might con-
fer competitive advantages to banks that
they could apply to these activities. The
regulatory framework behind the bank
safety net, however, contains provisions
to ensure that activities such as real estate
brokerage and management would not
endanger bank safety and soundness
and to limit the spread of the safety net
to new activities. Among these provi-
sions are sections 23A and 23B of the
Federal Reserve Act, which would limit
the bank’s exposure to the real estate
brokerage affiliate. Moreover, the pro-
posal could actually reduce risk by
enabling banks to diversify into new
product lines and provide another
source of noninterest income.
Conclusion
By loosening the strictures that had
prevented banks from moving into non-
traditional business lines, the Gramm–
Leach–Bliley Act allows banks to offer
new combinations of products and ser-
vices. These freedoms will allow the
market to play a greater role in deter-
mining the services banks will provide.
Reducing regulatory restrictions to
allow market forces to operate more
freely in banking provides benefits to
consumer and business users of bank
services. In a free-market economy, busi-
nesses—including banks—that offer
desirable services at a reasonable price
are rewarded by profit. When banks
have the freedom to choose the services
they offer, the quest for profits will result
in consumers getting the services they
value.
Market forces will play a major role
in allaying potential concerns about
banks’ entry into real estate brokerage
and management services. The Gramm–
Leach–Bliley provisions that allow banks
to move into nontraditional business lines
can benefit consumers by providing addi-
tional choices and reducing impediments
to competition among various financial
service providers. Given the opportunity,




Couch is a financial industry analyst,
Mahalik is a senior mortgage banking analyst
and Moore is a senior economist and policy
advisor in the Financial Industry Studies
Department at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas.
Notes
1 For simplicity, we use the term “bank” throughout the rest of the 
article, although the proposal technically applies to financial holding
companies and financial subsidiaries of national banks.
2 The proposal under consideration at the time of this writing deals 
with whether real estate brokerage and management are financial in
nature or incidental to a financial activity. If that proposal is not
adopted, real estate brokerage and management could still be deemed
permissible for banks under the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act if real
estate brokerage and management were ruled to be complementary to
a financial activity.
3 For a review of the issues and literature in the debate, see Saunders
(1994).
4 “Tying” involves making the terms or availability of credit or other ser-
vices dependent on the purchase of another product or service from
the bank or its affiliates.
5 Guzman (2001) discusses the distinction between concentration and
competition in banking markets.
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Exchange Fund issues and redeems Cer-
tificates of Indebtedness, which three
designated commercial banks hold as
backing for the banknotes they issue
3 at
the official rate of 7.8 Hong Kong dollars
per U.S. dollar. The HKMA also stands
ready at any time to buy back Hong
Kong dollars in the market.
4 In the past
decade, the total foreign currency reserves
have averaged over three times the size
of the monetary base, giving the HKMA
ample room to maneuver. In addition 
to strong foreign currency reserves, the
Hong Kong government’s fiscal prudence
and the city’s robust banking system and
flexible economic structure are important
underpinnings of the currency board.
Under the currency board, interest rates
are automatically adjusted in response 
to changes in the monetary base. When
there is depreciation pressure on the
Hong Kong dollar, the HKMA is obliged
to buy Hong Kong dollars at the official
rate. This causes the monetary base to
contract, pushing interest rates higher
and attracting foreign capital inflows so
as to maintain exchange-rate stability. If
the exchange rate strengthens, banks may
purchase Hong Kong dollars from the
HKMA. This expands the monetary base,
Beyond the Border
hen the Asian financial crisis
broke out in 1997, many
countries’ currencies tum-
bled and their economies suffered. How-
ever, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority
(HKMA) mounted a successful defense
of the Hong Kong dollar under the cur-
rency board arrangement.
1 In one of the
most unusual episodes in recent exchange-
rate history, the HKMA intervened simul-
taneously in the foreign exchange, stock,
stock futures and interbank markets. In
August 1998, at the height of the cur-
rency turmoil, it purchased $15 billion
worth of local blue-chip stocks.
Since Hong Kong’s 1997–98 crisis, the
financial markets have stabilized. The
stock market has recovered. Although 
its economy underwent five quarters 
of contraction from 1998 to early 1999,
Hong Kong survived the crisis with rela-
tively light damage compared with many
of its neighbors. By April 2001, the HKMA
had not only recouped the initial cost of
the intervention but had done so with sig-
nificant gains from equity appreciation.
The unprecedented intervention seems
to have worked. Nevertheless, the inter-
vention broke the Hong Kong govern-
ment’s laissez-faire tradition and drew
significant criticism. Now, with the bene-
fit of hindsight, we may be able to better
gauge the intervention’s effects and con-
sequences.
Why the Currency Board?
Hong Kong’s currency board was set
up in October 1983 to deal with the loss
of confidence caused by property deval-
uation, banking sector deterioration and
the uncertain political transition from Brit-
ish colonial rule to Chinese sovereignty.
In 1993, the HKMA was established to
oversee the currency board, which is
Hong Kong’s approach to providing a
nominal anchor for price stability.
Under the currency board, both the
stock and the flow of Hong Kong’s mone-
tary base are fully backed by U.S. dollar
reserves held in the Hong Kong Exchange
Fund, which the HKMA manages.
2 The
pulling interest rates down and, thus,
discouraging further capital inflows.
Facing Down the Crisis
During the Asian financial crisis, spec-
ulators exploited this interest rate pre-
dictability. They took short positions in
the Hong Kong stock and stock futures
markets. At the same time, they sold bor-
rowed Hong Kong dollars against the
U.S. dollar. Under the currency board,
the HKMA stood ready to buy back
Hong Kong dollars. And herein lies the
dilemma under the currency board. On
the one hand, continued buyback shrank
the monetary base and drove the short-
term interest rate up sharply, arresting
the outflow of U.S. dollars in defending
the currency board. On the other hand,
overnight interest rate upsurges—300
percent at one point in October 1997—
triggered precipitous drops in stock and
stock futures prices, producing hefty
profits for short-sellers. After every attack,
market confidence plummeted.
The HKMA feared Hong Kong’s econ-
omy could very well bleed to death if the
situation persisted. If the economy were
dead, what good could the mere preser-
vation of the currency board possibly
W
Currency Board and Market Intervention in Hong Kong
Markets Stabilize after HKMA Intervention
Percent HK dollars/U.S. dollars
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dollar futuresdo? If the situation got out of hand, the
only choice might be to abandon the
currency board. That’s the last thing the
HKMA wanted to see.
Few options were available to reverse
the trend of depleting foreign currency
reserves and bleeding equity markets.
Among them, two stood out—outright
capital control and direct intervention.
While during the crisis Malaysia adopted
the former, Hong Kong chose the latter.
When the speculative attack intensified
again in August 1998, the HKMA inter-
vened simultaneously in the money,
stock and stock futures markets in addi-
tion to buying back Hong Kong dollars.
During the last two weeks of August, 
it imposed penalty charges on targeted
borrowers that served as settlement
banks for the speculators and bought
$15 billion worth of Hang Seng Index
stocks (8 percent of the index’s capital-
ization). In addition, it took long posi-
tions that pushed the stock futures 20
percent higher. After the intervention,
the exchange rate quickly stabilized, and
currency futures and short-term inter-
est rates returned to sustainable levels
(Chart 1).
Facing harsh criticism for deviating
from its long-standing nonintervention
policy, the HKMA argued that the inter-
vention was justified by Hong Kong’s
strong economic fundamentals as well as
the extreme global financial turmoil. The
HKMA contended that without forceful
intervention, not only would the currency
board have collapsed but there would
also have been ripple effects. One only
need recall that about the same time,
Russia’s debt default triggered the Long
Term Capital Management crisis in the
United States, which forced the Federal
Reserve to step in with a rescue package
and lower the federal funds rate to pre-
vent a global financial meltdown.
Revisiting the Intervention
In retrospect, the intervention could
not have had a lasting stabilizing effect
without the favorable developments that
followed. These included the lower U.S.
interest rate mentioned earlier, the con-
tinued recovery of the regional econ-
omy, the rebound of foreign trade in
China and, particularly, China’s pledge
not to devalue its currency.
5 Meanwhile,
the HKMA adopted a series of technical
measures to enhance the currency
board.
6 There has even been discussion
about writing the currency board into
the Basic Law (Hong Kong’s constitu-
tion) to further deter any speculative
attack.
From an operational point of view,
whether the intervention was ultimately
a success hinges on the government’s
ability to properly dispose of the large
portfolio of Hang Seng Index stocks it
acquired during the intervention without
incurring a huge loss or causing the kind
of market turmoil it tried to subdue in
the first place. In November 1999, the
HKMA launched TraHK, a unit fund track-
ing the Hang Seng Index (Chart 2). A
large portion of the portfolio is being
sold back in batches through TraHK. By
April 2001, the sales had reached $15 bil-
lion, the same amount the HKMA pur-
chased during the intervention. With
equity appreciation, the remaining port-
folio currently amounts to $14 billion.
The HKMA will continue to dispose of its
holdings through TraHK, except for a
minor portion that will be held in the
Exchange Fund’s long-term investment
portfolio.
Long-Term Effects
In the long run, will Hong Kong’s
deviation from its traditional noninter-
vention policy spell doubt for future
investor confidence, capital flows and
corporate governance? Will the interven-
tion induce more risky behavior by both
foreign and local investors?
We don’t have all the facts yet. The
stock market has enjoyed a quick recov-
ery since mid-1999 and peaked in 2000
before the Nasdaq bubble burst. A num-
ber of major initial public offerings were
pushed through in 2000. International
capital continues to flow in and out un-
hindered. Because the intervention was
targeted at preserving the currency board
and maintaining exchange-rate stability
instead of simply propping up the local
stock market or controlling individual
stocks, the impact on corporate gover-
nance has been kept to a minimum.
The moral hazard related to the inter-
vention is definitely a downside risk that
requires careful handling. To the extent
that the Hong Kong government created
the impression that it would bail out the
stock market over and over again,
regardless of the reason for intervention,
the effect on private-sector risk taking
might make policymakers wish they had
followed a less interventionist policy.
The Hong Kong dollar’s long-term
stability depends on the continued
refinement of the exchange rate regime
to achieve a fine balance between the
monetary authority’s discretion and rules
of a strict currency board arrangement.
—Dong Fu
Fu is an assistant economist in the Research
Department at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas.
Notes
1 Hong Kong’s exchange rate arrangement differs from a pure currency
board in several aspects. There is a market exchange rate in addition
to the official rate. The HKMA also runs a discount window operation
using the Exchange Fund notes and bills. See also footnotes 2, 4 and 6.
2 Hong Kong’s monetary base also includes Certificates of Indebted-
ness, the aggregate balance of banks’ settlement accounts at the
HKMA and the Exchange Fund notes and bills. The fact that banks use
the Exchange Fund notes and bills in discount window borrowing
instead of selling them directly in the secondary market seems to 
suggest a discrepancy in the complete backing of the notes and bills.
Further research needs to be done to clarify this.
3 For historical reasons, the Hong Kong currency notes are issued by
three commercial banks and not by the HKMA.
4 During the financial crisis, the HKMA intervened at a rate slightly lower
than the official rate. The rule was changed later. Now, the HKMA buys
the Hong Kong dollar if it weakens below the official rate but maintains
certain discretion in selling if it appreciates above. So the market rate
may deviate slightly upward from the official rate from time to time.
5 The HKMA and the People’s Bank of China acted independently but
moved in concert during the currency turmoil. Although the HKMA had
enough foreign currency reserves to conduct the market operation, it
would have been entirely feasible for the People’s Bank of China to
step in had the need arisen. Currently, mainland China and Hong Kong
rank second and third in the world in foreign currency reserves.
6 Among them are the formal introduction of the discount window and
stricter rules for backing Exchange Fund notes and bills.
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TraHK Closely Tracks 
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he Texas economy continued to expand in first quar-
ter 2001 despite a cooling national economy. Total
private employment increased 3.3 percent (annualized).
Four sectors—mining, construction, services (narrowly defined)
and FIRE (finance, insurance and real estate)—contributed
64.5 percent of Texas’ first-quarter growth, even though they
account for only 42.1 percent of total employment.
Warning signs are still evident on the Southwest’s economic
front, though. Businesses across the board report sluggish
demand in recent weeks. The Texas Leading Index has con-
tinued to decline, suggesting further slowing. Unemployment
rose to 4.1 percent in March, up from 3.8 percent in February.
Initial unemployment claims rose.
High oil and natural gas prices spurred a 9 percent (annu-
alized) first-quarter increase in mining employment, but such
growth might not be sustainable if shortages of equipment and
Regional Update
Private Employment Growth by Sector
Texas Employment
Index, January 1998 = 100
Millions of workers Index, 1987 = 100
Texas Leading Index and Nonfarm Employment



















































Total Manufacturing Trade TCPU FIRE Services Construction Mining
Regional Economic Indicators
TEXAS EMPLOYMENT* TOTAL NONFARM EMPLOYMENT*
Texas Private New
Leading Index TIPI† total Mining Construction Manufacturing Government service-producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
3/01 121.3 — 155.4 578.5 1,087.8 1,581.5 6,214.5 9,617.7 1,947.6 752.0
2/01 122.2 131.7 153.4 575.2 1,087.6 1,579.1 6,191.1 9,586.4 1,950.5 751.0
1/01 123.9 131.4 153.0 574.3 1,087.2 1,575.4 6,175.8 9,565.7 1,946.1 750.7
12/00 122.7 131.2 152.1 571.4 1,085.0 1,570.4 6,161.9 9,540.8 1,934.8 748.9
11/00 123.2 131.1 152.0 568.7 1,085.7 1,567.4 6,142.2 9,516.0 1,931.1 748.9
10/00 124.7 131.1 151.6 567.2 1,085.5 1,564.8 6,127.3 9,496.4 1,931.0 748.2
9/00 125.8 131.3 151.2 566.2 1,085.4 1,566.8 6,112.3 9,481.9 1,928.6 747.7
8/00 126.3 131.4 150.7 564.3 1,084.6 1,563.0 6,100.9 9,463.5 1,927.2 746.2
7/00 126.5 131.1 150.1 561.1 1,085.8 1,564.9 6,069.2 9,431.1 1,925.6 744.2
6/00 126.2 130.1 149.9 563.1 1,088.6 1,568.2 6,064.4 9,434.2 1,926.0 741.5
5/00 125.9 129.0 149.1 558.1 1,087.6 1,589.0 6,045.8 9,429.6 1,934.9 743.6
4/00 126.9 128.4 148.5 555.6 1,084.1 1,561.9 6,027.9 9,378.0 1,926.2 741.6
* In thousands.  † Texas Industrial Production Index.
For more information on
employment data, see “Reassessing
Texas Employment Growth” (Southwest
Economy, July/August 1993). For TIPI,
see “The Texas Industrial Production
Index” (Dallas Fed Economic Review,
November 1989). For the Texas Leading
Index and its components, see “The
Texas Index of Leading Indicators: 
A Revision and Further Evaluation”
(Dallas Fed Economic Review, July
1990). Online economic data and
articles are available on the Dallas Fed’s
Internet web site, www.dallasfed.org.
T
qualified personnel persist. Construction employment rose a
healthy 5.1 percent (annualized); however, slower residential
traffic, reduced demand for office space and completion of
construction backlogs created by poor spring weather portend
slower growth in the sector. 
Although employment in narrowly defined services jumped
an annualized 4.8 percent during the first three months, tem-
porary services firms see activity slowing. Weakness in the
high-tech sector continued to hamper manufacturing job
growth, with first-quarter employment increasing only 1 per-
cent (annualized).
Job growth in the Texas metro areas is generally weaker than
a year ago. Austin, Dallas, Houston and El Paso saw only mod-
erate growth in first quarter 2001.
—John ThompsonRobert D. McTeer, Jr.
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FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS
HAVE A NICE DAY!
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
2000 Annual Report
American working conditions have
improved in just about every dimension
over the last century, including 
all-time-low death and accident rates,
comfortable work environments and
improved wages.
According to the Dallas Fed’s 2000
Annual Report essay, today’s New
Economy workers are more
independent and less subject to the
fortunes of a single employer.
Competition has been the key to 
rapid improvements in workplace conditions, enabling
employees to not only have a productive day but also have a nice day.
To access the 2000 Annual Report on the Dallas Fed web site, www.dallasfed.org, click on
Publications and Annual Reports. You can order a copy of the 2000 Annual Report by calling
the Publications Service Desk at 214-922-5254 or 800-333-4460, ext. 5254.